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CREEPING CONDITIONALITY IN THE UK: FROM WELFARE RIGHTS 
TO CONDITIONAL ENTITLEMENTS?1 
 
Abstract 
 
A widely recognised central tenet of New Labour’s ‘Third Way’ is no rights without 
responsibilities. The extent to which this idea underpins the British government’s 
approach to welfare reform has been extensively commented upon. Initially, the 
article places the UK reforms in the context of wider theoretical debates about welfare 
reform in Western states. It then highlights the ways in which a principle of 
conditionality is being practically applied in a wide range of sectors in the UK 
including; social security, housing, education, and health.  The details and impact of 
recent relevant legislation and initiatives are discussed. It is argued that as policies 
based on conditional entitlement become central to the ongoing process of welfare 
reform the very idea of ‘welfare rights’ is systematically undermined. 
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Introduction 
 
According to Giddens (1998) the prime motto of Third Way politics is no “rights 
without responsibilities” (:65). Indeed, the extent to which this principle underpins the 
British Government’s general approach to welfare reform has been extensively 
commented upon (Deacon, 2002a; Dwyer, 2002, 2000, 1998; Prideaux, 2001; Etzioni, 
2000; Lister, 1998; Powell, 1999)2.  Following this introduction, part one of the paper 
places the recent UK welfare reforms, which have a ‘principle of conditionality’ at 
their core,  within a discussion of the wider emergence of ‘active/Third Way’ social 
policies in many Western welfare states. Part two then highlights the ways in which 
conditionality is being practically applied in an increasingly wide range of UK 
welfare policy areas  namely; social security, housing, education, and health. Details 
of recent, relevant legislation and initiatives in these sectors are discussed. Part three, 
moves on to explore some of the effects of this approach for welfare provision. It is 
argued that as policies based on conditional entitlement become central to New 
Labour’s vision the very idea of ‘welfare rights’ is systematically undermined. The 
implications of this approach, in terms of New Labour’s welfare project and, more 
generally, citizens’ social rights are noted in the conclusion.  
 
                                                 
2 A discussion of the philosophical underpinnings of New Labour’s approach to welfare reform lies 
beyond the remit of this paper. Interested readers should refer to: Deacon (2002a); Dwyer (2000); 
Heron and Dwyer (1999): Driver and Martell (1998); Levitas (1998). 
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Echoing the earlier work of R. Kent Weaver (1986), Pierson argues that “the 
contemporary politics of the welfare state is the politics of blame avoidance” (1996 
:179). Third Way welfare reforms that stress reduced access to public welfare 
provision, a strong link between rights and responsibilities, and an increasingly moral 
agenda meet the requirements of cost containing governments rather than the needs of 
citizens. The welfare rights of those deemed ‘irresponsible’ because they cannot, or 
will not, meet certain state endorsed standards or regulations may be withdrawn or 
reduced. This enables politicians to place the blame for the predicament of those 
whose right to publicly funded welfare is reduced or removed firmly at the door of the 
individuals concerned. Their exclusion from public welfare arrangements thus 
becomes less problematic for the government (Dwyer, 2000, 1998). Inactive welfare 
recipients thus become expedient ‘scapegoats’ (see Weaver, 1986 :387) for 
administrations looking to avoid the blame for any negative outcomes that may ensue 
for those citizens whose access to collective social welfare provision is diminished as 
a consequence of the introduction of active/Third Way welfare policies.  
 
A shift from ‘welfare society’ to ‘active society’ 
 
Built around three rights elements (i.e. civil, political and social) Marshall’s theory  
(1950/1992) of citizenship implied an equality of status universally enjoyed by all 
deemed to be citizens. It was the addition of a third social rights element which 
promised,  
the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security, 
to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live civilised life 
according to the standards prevailing in society” (Marshall, 1992: 8),  
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that made the citizenship status of the social democratic post war welfare settlement 
(PWWS) both distinctive and substantive when compared to that which had gone 
before. Although Marshall saw citizenship as a status that entailed both rights and 
duties it is clear that a general concern with social rights, rather than responsibilities 
characterised his approach. Many (e.g. Etzioni, 2000, 1997; Mead, 1997; Giddens, 
1994) have subsequently criticised his account for placing the idea of unconditional 
entitlement to welfare at the centre of his account. Marshall’s view that rights to 
welfare should be both universal and unconditional was shared by Titmuss, Tawney 
and others, who were also concerned to ensure that public welfare would lessen 
inequalities and foster a sense of social solidarity between citizens (Deacon, 2002a; 
Cox, 1998). 
 
Fifty years on the ideas that were central to these “conceptual architects of the welfare 
state” (Cox, 1998: 3) are viewed by many to be both outdated and likely to exacerbate 
passive welfare dependency. In recent years a number of profound economic, political 
and social changes in Western societies (rf. Williams, 1999; Cox, 1998; Walters, 
1997) have resulted in significant changes in the organisation of contemporary 
welfare states (Taylor-Gooby, 2002). Much talk of a new ‘Third Way’ politics has 
emerged; most notably but not exclusively in the UK and USA. According to a chief 
exponent (Giddens, 1998, 1994) the correct role for governments to assume in relation 
to welfare is to encourage an ‘entrepreneurial culture’ that rewards ‘responsible risk 
takers’. This new ‘social investment state’, meets its commitments to social justice 
and equality via the redistribution of ‘possibilities’ (primarily the opportunity to work 
and the right to education), rather than wealth. Giddens is also unequivocal in making 
a reciprocal relationship between rights and responsibilities central to his approach. 
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Embraced with some enthusiasm by New Labour in Britain, (Blair, 1998) this ‘new’ 
politics can be seen as a fundamental challenge to the “post war idea of the welfare 
state based on the principle of universal entitlement derived from citizenship” (Cox, 
1998: 3).  
 
Whilst many governments optimistically endorse welfare which prioritises 
responsible individual agency as a panacea for dependency, others are more sceptical 
about the current direction of welfare reform. Walters (1997) argues that the ‘welfare 
society’ of the past that promised, theoretically at least, a common citizenship status 
which guaranteed a universal minimum of welfare rights, has today been superseded 
by the ‘active society’ in which increasingly individuals can only access social rights 
if they are willing to become workers in the paid labour market (PLM). Walters is 
aware of the false universalism of the PWWS and the fact that that a person’s 
participation and position in the highly stratified PLM has long been of central 
importance in defining the quality and extent of an their access to public provision. 
His key point is that a fundamental shift has occurred. Although imperfect, in the 
‘welfare society’ of the past the state exempted certain ‘inactive’ groups from PLM 
participation. This was because either they were recognised as making socially valid 
contributions elsewhere (e.g. women engaged in informal/familial care work) or 
because they had previously contributed (e.g. retired senior citizens). Today, “many of 
these assumptions about the specifically social obligations and consequent rights of 
the citizen no longer apply…The active society makes us all workers” (Walters, 1997: 
223-4). Policies that seek to promote unconditional entitlement to public welfare 
benefits are seen as entrenching welfare dependency. If necessary, reluctant 
individuals should be forced into activity by the application of benefit sanctions. Only 
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those who ‘take charge’ of their own lives are deemed to be responsible ‘active’ 
citizens (Wetherly, 2001). This is certainly an agenda that New Labour have been 
keen to endorse and such ideas enjoy more extensive support. Increasingly they 
inform policy across Europe (Lǿdemel and Trickey, 2000; Van Oorschot, 2000), in 
the USA (Deacon, 2002a; Prideaux, 2001; O’Connor, 1998), Australia and elsewhere 
(Goodin, 2002).  
 
In the USA influential thinkers like Lawrence Mead (1997, 1986) have long argued 
that the existence of unconditional social benefits has helped to create a welfare 
dependant ‘underclass’. The welfare state of the past offered support but expected 
little in return. Mead (1997) argues that not only is conditionality both generally 
popular and functional but also that the imposition of compulsory work conditions for 
the recipients of state benefit effectively re-establishes their right to be regarded as 
citizens. He believes that previously permissive welfare regimes and the unconditional 
nature of their benefits marked out the poor as recipients of state charity rather than as 
citizens entitled to state support in return for their acceptance of specified 
responsibilities. Conditionality thus restores their right to equal citizenship status 
because, as Mead has stated, “only those who bear obligations can truly appropriate 
their rights” (1986: 257). A case for recipients of social welfare to voluntarily accept 
their obligations could of course be made, but Mead has rejected this as unlikely to 
succeed. He holds that it is right and proper for the  state to use paternalistic authority 
to compel individuals to return to the labour market.  
 
These type of ideas have found practical expression in the reform of the US welfare 
system in the past decade. ‘Workfare’ schemes in which  state welfare benefits are 
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dependant on recipients accepting attendant state-defined work are now a central 
feature of social policy in the USA (King, 1999). The Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (1996), which sets a five year lifetime limit for 
the receipt of benefits and enforces more stringent work requirements on lone mothers 
illustrates the extent to which limited and conditional welfare benefits have become 
the accepted norm in the USA (rf Deacon, 2002a; Béland et al, 2001 for details). This 
shift towards social policies that combine coercive paternalism and conditional 
entitlement to effectively reduce the rights of vulnerable citizens is not without its 
opponents (see King, 1999). In the context of this paper, however, it is important to 
note that American ideas and experiences have influenced UK reform process and 
New Labour appears to be unwilling to listen to such critics.  
 
The consequences of such reforms should not be dismissed lightly. Pierson (2001; 
1996) has argued that mature welfare states are resilient institutions which are often 
resistant to retrenchment. The new politics of welfare is different from the earlier 
politics of expansion. Retrenchment is generally unpopular and politicians who 
attempt to cut back public welfare are in the business of blame avoidance rather than 
credit claiming. They also often face entrenched opposition from voters and interest 
groups. Pierson states that measuring retrenchment is a difficult task. One significant 
indicator of a structural shift in welfare states are “dramatic changes in benefit and 
eligibility rules that signal a qualitative reform of a  particular program” (1996 :157). 
The welfare reform policies outlined below illustrate that such a qualitative shift is 
ongoing within the UK welfare state. The idea of welfare rights is being superseded 
by one of conditional entitlement. The change is not limited to Britain. As Deacon 
(2002a) notes ending the right to welfare was central to US welfare reform in the 
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1990s. It is possible to dismiss the UK reforms and policy changes in the outlined 
below as minor and of little long-term consequence but as Cox notes such ‘tinkering’ 
often has far reaching consequences.  
Though tinkering is often viewed as a substitute for real reform it can lead to 
important change especially when its cumulative impact is taken into 
consideration. Years of austerity measures, numerous small manipulations in 
programme eligibility, decentralisation of administrative responsibility, a shift 
from passive to active unemployment measures, all of these are important 
changes (1998 :2). 
 
Creeping conditionality in the UK 
 
A principle of conditionality holds that eligibility to certain basic, publicly provided, 
welfare entitlements should be dependent on an individual first agreeing to meet 
particular compulsory duties or patterns of behaviour (Deacon, 1994). This section 
aims to map the extent to which this principle now informs welfare policy in the UK. 
Very few, if any, welfare rights are totally unconditional. In many ways, a significant 
number of social rights are and always have been, to some extent conditional. 
Principles of (contingent) universality, contribution and social assistance have long 
been a feature of most European welfare states. It has also recently been argued that 
conditionality features throughout the history of British welfare (Powell, 2002). The 
vital point to note here, however, is the extent to which a principle of conditionality 
has become central to the organisation of contemporary public welfare in the UK. As 
Deacon (2002a) notes, the whole hearted endorsement of this approach by a British 
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Labour government would have been unthinkable less than a decade ago, but it is now 
fundamental to their vision of a 21st century welfare state. 
  
Social Security 
 
A principle of conditionality is at the core of New Labour’s welfare to work agenda. 
In April 2002 when launching the national Job Centre Plus initiative the Prime 
Minister restated the major themes central to his government’s welfare reforms. 
Emphasising an enabling welfare state, he stressed three elements in the government’s 
strategy for reducing dependency on social welfare benefits. 
The first is Job Centre Plus; the second to extend the concept of the New Deals 
and rights and responsibilities beyond the unemployed to the sick and disabled 
(sic). The third part is new opportunities for skilled jobs ( Blair, 2002: 6). 
Job Centre Plus retains many of the central components of the ‘One’ initiative that it 
replaced. Anyone claiming working age benefits must agree to take part in a work 
focused interview with an assigned adviser as a condition of benefit eligibility. The 
list of benefits that this measure covers is extensive and includes; jobseeker’s 
allowance, income support, incapacity benefit, maternity allowance, bereavement 
benefits, industrial injuries disablement benefit, care allowance and the social fund 
(Treolar, 2001).  
 
Within the existing ‘New Deals’ for the young and long-term unemployed the link 
between rights and responsibilities has been clearly defined since 1997. Failure to take 
up one of the four work/training options offered results in punitive benefit sanctions. 
Claimants can lose some or all of their benefit for a period of between 2 and 26 weeks 
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depending on circumstances (DWP, 2002a). Detailed data on the numbers effected by 
cuts and suspensions in various benefits are hard to attain but in the quarter yearly 
periods between October/December 1998 and July/September 2000 the numbers of 
young people sanctioned varied between a low 2,695 and a high of 5,157 (Bivand, 
2001). Government figures relating to JSA show some 21,000 claimants as subject to 
sanctions in May 2002 (DWP, 2002a). 
 
Various similar, although perhaps less severe approaches, for lone parents and 
disabled people are clearly part of the immediate future. Entitlement conditions for 
both groups are becoming more restrictive. From April 2001 work focused interviews 
became compulsory for most lone parents claiming income support with children aged 
13 years plus.3 Since April 2003 all lone parents claiming income support have been 
required to attend. Coupled to this benefit entitlement for many lone parents is 
conditional on a woman naming a child’s absent father under rules introduced under 
the Child Support Act 1991.  
 
In relation to disabled people reforms introduced in the Welfare Reform and Pensions 
Act (1999) - strengthening the link between work and entitlement to incapacity 
benefit so that only those who have recently been in work and paid NI contributions 
are eligible; the application of the ‘all work test’ (now called the capability 
assessment); attendance at a work focused interview - can be seen as meeting the 
requirements of a cost cutting government rather than meeting the needs of disabled 
people who do not work. The Prime Minister is keen to emphasise that the 
                                                 
3 In the period between 30th April 2001 and 29th March 2002 1,531 lone parents were sanctioned for 
failing to attend the compulsory interview without good cause (Hansard, 2002). 
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government’s social security strategy is focused on enabling (re)entry into the PLM 
whilst simultaneously recognising the needs of those who are unable to work because 
of personal impairments The stated aim of present policy is to return as many of the 
2.7 million people currently in receipt of disability and incapacity benefits to the 
workforce (Blair, 2002).  
 
The third element of the UK government’s strategy, the creation of opportunities for 
real skilled jobs, establishes the limits of New Labour’s, rather than claimants, 
responsibilities. The idea behind the ‘Ambitions’ programmes announced as part of 
Job Centre Plus is to enable people to get higher skilled, better paid jobs and so tackle 
a situation where people remain unemployed when certain employers can’t get skilled 
staff (Blair, 2002). Such job creation initiatives should be broadly welcomed but 
allied to this, as Treolar notes, creeping conditionality is becoming an established part 
of government benefit policy  
For more and more claimants, benefit entitlement is going to be dependent on 
satisfying work related conditions. Where that leaves the concept of a right to 
benefit is a matter for speculation. The impact on claimant attitude and 
behaviour is yet to become fully apparent (2001 :3) 
 
Alongside the enforcement of work related conditions, the linking of certain benefit 
rights to behavioural conditions is also an increasing aspect of UK social policy 
debates. Following Frank Field (Minister for Welfare Reform 1997-1998), the 
government strongly supported the proposals outlined in his Housing Benefit 
(Withholding of Payment) Bill (2002). This proposes that the right to housing benefit 
be withdrawn, for a maximum of 12 months, from individuals who (or whose 
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children) have been convicted twice, within a three year period, by the courts of anti-
social behaviour. Field is explicit that his aim is to reform the behaviour of a small 
minority of persistent offenders. He believes that in extreme circumstances children 
should be taken into care until their parents either agree to control them adequately or 
start to behave in an appropriate manner themselves (Field, 2002). Most recently, 
(January 2004), the Government has announced that it will no longer be supporting 
the Bill, however, the relevant Minister noted, “we want to judge the effectiveness of  
the range of existing measures before introducing a new one. But we have not ruled 
out other means, in the future as we learn from experience and establish what works” 
(Pond, in DWP, 2004). 
 
The most  controversial, suggestions to emerge were those which proposed  
withdrawing of Child Benefit from parents whose children persistently truant from 
school and/or engage in anti-social behaviour (Finch, 2002). Following  strong dissent 
from both within and beyond the government the suggestions have since been 
dropped. The initial enthusiasm with which the Prime Minister and many of his inner 
circle embraced this and the housing benefit proposals does, however, illustrate both 
the ideological distance that New Labour has travelled in a relatively short time and 
the extent to which a principle of conditionality now informs much social security 
policy. 
 
Housing 
 
Aside from the new developments in relation to Housing Benefit discussed above 
conditionality is now a key feature of contemporary social housing policy in the UK. 
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Arguably, against a political backdrop which increasingly identifies certain social 
housing tenants as part of an ‘underclass’, a more punitive approach to the 
management of social housing has emerged. Linking housing rights to responsible 
behaviour is not, however, straightforward. Definitions of anti-social behaviour may 
encompass a wide range of conduct, from children playing where they annoy 
neighbours, to serious criminal activity, racial harassment or violent attacks (Flint, 
2002; Card, 2001; Hunter 2001).  
 
The Housing Act (1996) delivered by the last Conservative administration bought 
about significant changes that linked the right to reside in social housing to specific 
behavioural responsibilities. Probationary tenancy periods (PTPs) of twelve months 
duration were introduced. These render tenants who behave in an ‘anti-social’ manner 
within the trial period liable to eviction and are local authorities can revoke the right  
to a future secure tenancy. It also became easier for social and private landlords to 
evict existing tenants on the grounds of anti-social behaviour. As Hunter argues, 
The approach of the 1996 Act can be said to be one which targets those living in 
social housing, reduces and limits the rights of such people, and ultimately 
takes away the one of their most basic rights, the right to live in their home 
(2001: 228). 
A range of instruments are now available to social landlords to manage tenants which 
make the right to housing subject to conditionality. They appear to be having a 
practical effect. By 1999 30% of local authorities (LAs) and 13% of registered social 
landlords (RSLs) had introduced PTPs. Half of these local authorities had evicted 
tenants in a 12 month period with 19% of evictions based on nuisance (Nixon et al, 
1999 cited in Card, 2001). Evidence also suggests that housing agencies are managing 
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anti-social behaviour by encouraging tenants to be responsible e.g. by introducing 
Good Neighbour Charters in Glasgow4) and by allowing representatives to sit on 
letting committees to vet potential tenants (Flint, 2002). The exclusion of nuisance 
neighbours via the denial of a tenancy is now an established part of local policy. 
Figures from Smith et al (2001), note that “47.7% [of LAs and RSLs surveyed] 
excluded on the basis of ex-tenant behaviour and 40% for tenant behaviour” (cited in 
Card, 2001 :210). A consultation paper indicates that the government is in favour of 
strengthening and expanding the powers of social landlords in order to ‘crack down’ 
on anti-social tenants (DTLR, 2002). 
 
New Labour have also introduced anti-social behaviour orders (ASBOs) in the Crime 
and Disorder Act (1998). These civil court orders grant a LA or the police the power 
to prohibit an individual from acting in a specified anti-social manner and/or the 
power to exclude an individual from their home or other specified locality. It is, 
however, a criminal offence (potentially punishable by imprisonment) to break the 
conditions set out in an order. In the period 1st April 1999 to 30th  June 2003 1337 
ASBOs were served (Home Office, 2003a). ASBOs have been used successfully in 
neighbourhood disputes and to tackle youth crime and are now beginning to be used 
to remove people from a particular area in order to combat street crimes such as drug 
dealing and prostitution. The government is convinced of the value of ASBOs and is 
committed to extending their scope and use in new legislation (Home Office, 2003b). 
 
                                                 
4 Cf. Dwyer, (2000; 1998) on Mutual Aid Clauses in Bradford. 
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In general the courts have been supportive of social landlords and LAs when they 
have pursued the legal options open to them. However, as Hunter (2001) argues, it is 
often those tenants most in need of support (i.e. those suffering from mental or 
physical impairments, people with alcohol/drug dependency problems, previous 
victims of physical or sexual abuse etc.) who attract the majority of complaints from 
neighbours. Punitive legal measures that link housing rights to responsibilities look 
set to remain a part of policy in the near future; whether or not they tackle the 
underlying causes of much anti-social behaviour remains highly debatable (Hunter, 
2001). Recent legislation enacted to deal with anti-social behaviour in social housing 
and local communities is, however, a clear example of how welfare sanctions, in this 
case the removal of the right to a home, are increasingly becoming part of a wider law 
and order agenda. 
 
Adult Education  
 
In December 2000 the Secretary of State for Education outlined the need for a ‘radical 
and imaginative strategy’ (Blunkett, 2000) to tackle the problem of adult illiteracy in 
the UK which he identified as a significant cause of social exclusion from the PLM, 
decent jobs and wider community networks. In setting a target to reduce the number 
of adults with very weak numeracy/literacy skills by ¾ million by 2004, Blunkett 
announced a series of pilot projects across England to begin in March 2001. Again 
conditionality is very much part of the UK government’s thinking.  
 
The nine localised schemes established as part of the ‘Skills for Life’ strategy test the 
effectiveness of a variety of ‘carrot and stick’ approaches in persuading jobseekers’ 
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allowance (JSA) claimants to learn basic skills. In Wearside appropriate individuals 
are referred to a full-time basic education scheme, given £10 per week extra benefit 
for attending, and £100 bonus for successful completion of the course. In contrast 
some claimants in north Nottinghamshire/Leeds are not so lucky. Since 17/9/01 the 
right to JSA of these claimants (aged 25-49) is subject to removal if they refuse, or 
give up, their allocated place on a basic educational skills programme. Initially benefit 
will be withheld for two weeks and this period will be doubled for a second ‘offence’ 
(Treolar, 2001). The government is still assessing the impacts of the scheme but it has 
not ruled out the possibility of national roll out even though the Social Security 
Advisory Committee has stated it is against sanctions in this area (SSAC, 2002).  
 
Healthcare 
  
The direct imposition of a principle of conditionality within the public healthcare 
system of the UK remains limited.5 A universal right to free healthcare continues to 
be a core aspect of social citizenship. However, conditionality is beginning to appear 
in policy. Against the backdrop of a rising number of attacks on healthcare staff 
(many involving patients under the influence of drink and/or drugs), the governme
has declared that it will support staff who (under the threat of immediate danger), 
make on the spot decisions and refuse treatment for violent patients (DoH 2002a). 
Furthermore, borrowing from the range of powers previously discussed, the Queens 
nt 
                                                 
5 Rationing healthcare according to principles other than individual need, which include the denial of 
treatment because of an individual’s habits or behaviour (e.g. drinking, smoking etc.) has, however, 
long been part of Nation Health Service practice in the UK. For a consideration of such debates refer to 
Dwyer (2000); Langan, (1998). 
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Medical Centre in Nottingham, has also used court injunctions and ASBOs to ban 
three people from entering hospital grounds; unless they are in need of lifesaving 
treatment (Carvel, 2001). 
 
An element of conditionality has been built into the improved Sure Start Maternity 
Grant (SSMG) (Deacon, 2002b; Dean, 2002). This grant is available to new mothers 
who are (or whose partners are) recipients of income support, income based JSA, 
working families tax credit or disabled persons tax credit. It has been increased in 
value from £100 to £500 in the past two years. However, payment of the grant is now 
conditional on a parent producing a signed certificate stating that they have received 
suitable advice about their new child’s care from an approved healthcare professional 
(DoH, 2000). This may well be an example of the least punitive type of conditionality 
but those who do not have the relevant approval are not eligible for the grant. 
Statistics indicate that in the period 2001/2, 8,433 claims for SSMG were initially 
refused because the required certification was not provided by the applicant (DWP, 
2002b).  
 
Most recently plans to modernise the Welfare Food Scheme (which currently provides 
milk tokens and vitamins to mothers, babies and toddlers in 800,000 plus low income 
families), indicate that the government is considering a further extension of the 
conditional approach that it introduced for the SSMG.  Under the new proposals milk 
tokens will be replaced by vouchers that can be exchanged for a more extensive range 
of healthy foods (e.g. fruit). In order to be eligible to receive the vouchers, however, 
mothers will have to register with certain healthcare professionals on three specified 
occasions before and after the birth of a child (CPAG, 2002; DoH, 2002b) 
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Discussions in this section of the paper illustrate that conditionality is becoming an 
established and important element of social policy within the UK. The question 
remains, however, as to why New Labour has been able to pursue its approach to 
welfare reform without encountering sustained opposition. The Government’s 
dominance in the House of Commons has been one obvious practical advantage. New 
Labour’s persistent and persuasive repetition of the Third Way mantra ‘no rights 
without responsibilities’, and its general acceptance by all mainstream political parties 
in the UK, has probably been of more significance however in establishing a new 
consensus around social citizenship. Those citizens who refuse to accept New 
Labour’s highly conditional approach to social welfare are widely regarded as 
violating the central principle at the heart of the new welfare contract between citizen 
and state, i.e. “that rights offered go with responsibilities owed” (Labour Party, 1997 : 
1). Once this norm is broken it then becomes a relatively simple matter for the 
government to highlight a lack of personal responsibility on the part of the errant 
citizen as the root cause of an individual’s lack of welfare rights. In doing so New 
Labour is, using Weaver’s (1986) terminology, able to ‘pass the buck’ (i.e. deflect the 
blame back for loss of social right back to the individual in question), whilst 
simultaneously avoiding any blame in denying some UK citizens access to public 
welfare. 
 
From welfare rights to conditional entitlements? 
 
Having outlined the details of specific legislation and initiatives in the UK it is now 
important to discuss the wider implications that such changes may have for 
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contemporary notions of citizenship. Initially, this task leads us towards more 
philosophical debates concerned with our understanding of ‘rights’ in general and 
welfare rights in particular. Allied questions of the relationship between rights and 
responsibilities, whether rights are by their very definition unconditional, and where 
this leaves the idea of social/welfare rights also need to be considered. Following a 
brief outline of these deliberations, this section of the paper moves on to examine 
whether or not it is reasonable for governments (such as the New Labour 
administration in the UK), to rewrite the welfare contract between the individual and 
the state as part of the ongoing process of welfare reform. This is facilitated by a 
consideration of White’s (2000) defence of ‘welfare contractualism’ and Goodin’s 
(2000) condemnation of such approaches. 
 
Citizenship and welfare: the demise of social rights? 
 
Ever since Marshall’s 1949 lecture the social rights element of his theory has been the 
subject of contentious debate. A number of writers, most notably, but not exclusively 
from the ‘libertarian’ Right of the political spectrum (e.g. Nozick, 1995; Freidman, 
1962; Hayek, 1944) have effectively denied the validity of the social rights element. 
The standard distinction made in relation to the triumvirate of citizenship rights is 
between ‘negative’ civil and political rights on the one hand, and, ‘positive’ social 
rights on the other. This differentiation mirrors two views about the proper role of the 
state in relation to rights and the promotion/protection of agency among its citizenry. 
According to the negative view, the state’s duty is to promote civil and political rights 
which ensure agency by protecting individuals from interference from others. The 
emphasis here is on is on autonomy and liberty. Supporters of ‘positive’ social rights 
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on the other hand hold that in modern capitalist societies this approach is not enough; 
agency requires “some minimum material provision – that is, some sort of right to 
welfare” (Griffin, 2000: 29). A number of strong arguments can be mobilised to 
mount a philosophical defence of the notion of welfare rights and also to undermine 
the ‘negative’ position of the libertarian Right (see Griffin, 2000; Sample, 1998; 
Bauhn, 1997). This distinction between positive/negative understandings of rights is, 
however, of significance because it is often used in conjunction with another criticism 
of welfare rights that has become increasingly influential in recent years; namely that 
the existence of an extensive set of social rights has led to the formation of a welfare 
dependant ‘underclass’ (see Mead, 1986, 1997; Murray, 1984).  
 
Selbourne (1994) for example, concludes that a proliferation of ‘dutiless rights’ has 
led to a malaise that strikes at the heart of modern citizenship and threatens social 
cohesion. The way to halt this demise is to assert the primacy of a ‘principle of duty’ 
over and above the idea of rights; particularly in the social sphere. Rights to public 
welfare are seen here as ‘generally lesser order entitlements’ to privileges and 
benefits, which do not possess, nor should be afforded similar legal status to civil and 
political rights. Furthermore, he holds that “notions of egalitarian entitlement to such 
‘rights’ which owe nothing to the individual’s desert or merits,” (Selbourne, 1994 :60) 
undermine the moral basis of the civic order. For these reasons Selbourne argues that 
publicly provided welfare benefits and services should not be viewed as part of the 
package of rights that inform a universally held status of ‘citizen’ but that they should 
be seen as potential privileges that a society may bestow on dutiful members who 
behave in an approved manner. In short, what are generally referred to as welfare 
‘rights’ are nothing of the sort, they are merely highly conditional entitlements. 
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Aspects of this interpretation of welfare rights and the respective roles of governments 
and individuals in meeting responsibilities inform New Labour’s thinking on welfare 
reform. In making the principle of conditionality central to its approach, New Labour 
is moving away from Marshall’s position and endorsing the development of a welfare 
system in which rights to welfare are being superseded by lesser order conditional 
entitlements to social provisions. The extent to which this shift can be justified is 
explored below. 
 
Rewriting the rules or disciplining poor people? 
 
A defence of the principle of conditionality can be found in the work of White (2000). 
Access to welfare benefits is one side of the contract between the citizen and 
community which has as its reverse side various responsibilities that the 
individual citizen is obliged to meet: as a condition of eligibility for welfare 
benefits, the state may legitimately enforce these responsibilities, which 
centrally include the responsibility to work (White, 2000: 507). 
The implicit assumption of this stance is that access to public welfare services is 
arranged around a system of conditional entitlements rather than welfare rights. 
Certain commentators argue that what White calls ‘welfare contractualism’ violates 
the lack of conditionality at the core of T. H. Marshall’s vision of citizenship. White 
refutes such arguments by stating that Marshall’s approach can be seen to be 
consistent with an “unconditional right of reasonable access to a given resource rather 
than the dominant interpretation of a right to be given the same resource 
unconditionally” (2000: 510). In addition he argues that Marshall himself, and the 
‘liberal socialist tradition’ from which he emerged, would be comfortable with this 
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approach. White also notes that Marshall did stress that responsibilities, most 
importantly the ‘essential duty to work’ (Marshall, 1992: 46), were part and parcel of 
citizenship and that they became more important in his later works (cf. Powell, 2002; 
Rees, 1995).  
 
Welfare contractualism is justified by White on grounds of a ‘reciprocity principle’ 
linked to a wider understanding of distributive justice. Arguing that people are 
essentially ‘Homo reciprocans’ (i.e. co-operative beings willing to accept that it is 
legitimate that they be asked to make certain contributions, provided others do 
likewise), he also believes that welfare contractualism can be defended on the grounds 
that it prevents freeloaders from exploiting fellow citizens. Having made the case for 
welfare contractualism he then goes on to state that it is only reasonable to enforce 
such an approach if the society that implements it meets the following five conditions. 
First, the guarantee of a reasonable minimum standard of living for those who co-
operate with conditional welfare schemes. Second, the provision of real opportunities, 
so those involved participate in a productive manner that improves the quality of life 
for both the individual concerned and the wider community. Third, a recognition that 
other forms of contribution beyond paid work (e.g. informal care work) are valid. 
Forth, the “universal enforcement of the minimum standard of productive 
participation” (White, 2000 :516). Fifth, a society must ensure that a reasonable level 
of equal opportunity exists for all its members. 
 
Taking each of these conditions in turn it is possible to judge the extent to which New 
Labour’s welfare reforms could be seen as reasonable. An element of New Labour’s 
approach has been to improve certain benefits - e.g. child benefit, children’s 
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allowances for those income support/income related JSA - (rf. Lister, 2001) and also 
to introduce a system of tax credits ‘to make work pay’. A minimum income 
guarantee of £179 per week and help with child care cost for lone parents working 16 
hours plus per week are also part of the Job Centre plus initiative (Blair, 2002). 
However, whether or not the ‘enhanced’ benefits offered to participants offer a 
reasonable standard of living is more contentious.  
 
Assessing White’s second condition concerning the need to provide real opportunities 
that enhance both the individual and wider society is also complicated. The 1.25 
million people helped back into work since the New Deals began (Blair, 2002) are not 
to be dismissed lightly, but other evidence is less positive. Certain commentators have 
suggested that the New Deals may not be as successful as they at first appear and 
make strong arguments that industry and capital rather than unemployed people/lone 
parents are the real beneficiaries of the New Deals (Grover and Stewart, 2000; Gray, 
2001; Prideaux, 2001). Peck (2001) also notes that job entry rates for the New Deal to 
March 2000 were modest, with overall only a third of participants leaving to enter 
paid work. He also argues that many of those who leave the New Deal become 
trapped in ‘contingent employment’ i.e. they continually move from one short term, 
low paid, insecure job to another. 
 
The UK government’s own research also indicates some strong reservations about the 
effectiveness of its chosen approach. Only 27% of companies participating in the 
‘One’ scheme recruited lone parents to their workforce with even less (20%) taking on 
the long-term unemployed. People with mental or physical impairments fared 
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considerably worse6 (DSS, 2001). More recently the Adult Learning Inspectorate (a 
government agency) issued a damning appraisal of the New Deal for Young People. 
The recruitment figures noted for this scheme for the four years up to 2001 appear 
positive7 but the report highlights some serious shortcomings. Sixty percent of the 
training for young adults provided by either the government or companies involved is 
condemned as inadequate. Similarly, although full-time education and training was 
the most popular option with recruits (40% of 18-24 year olds) only 26% of those 
participating got a job and 31% a qualification (ALI, 2002). The aim is for all trainees 
to achieve both by the end of their one year course.  
 
A number of studies have noted the potential positive effects of policies that 
encourage lone parents into the paid labour market but simultaneously they have 
emphasised that the provision of quality support and education/training schemes and 
help with childcare are vitally important (Heron et al, 2002; Bradshaw, 1996). The 
government appears to endorse these findings and, as previously noted, sets out less 
stringent requirements for the receipt of benefits by lone parents. However, in making 
it clear that in future lone parents will be expected to enter the PLM the government is 
implying that the contribution that they make as informal carers outside the PLM is an 
inadequate basis on which to make a claim for public support (Gray, 2001; Levitas, 
                                                 
6  8% of participating employers recruited people with physical impairments, 5% with mental 
impairments (DSS, 2001) 
7 Of the four options available; 112,700 young people went into full-time education/training 52,500 
into government subsidised employment – 60% of whom went onto unsubsidised employment, 60,000 
to voluntary sector and 56,000 joined the environment task force (ALI, 2002). 
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1998). It would appear that the third condition required by White for the legitimate 
application of a reciprocity principle, the recognition of forms of contribution outside 
the PLM, remains unsatisfied.  
 
White’s fourth condition the ‘universal enforcement of the minimum standard of 
productive participation’ echoes Giddens (1998) declaration that the new 
rights/responsibilities rule must be evenly and universally applied. Although such 
even handed thinking is commendable it fails to reflect reality (Goodin, 2000). In 
relation to the social element of citizenship it is largely the rights of poor people that 
are being reduced whilst simultaneously the attendant responsibilities required to 
access those rights are being increased (Dwyer, 2002, 2000, 1998:). As for the final 
contingency required i.e. a reasonable level of equality of opportunity for all members 
of British society, the government by its own admission recognises the limits of 
contemporary meritocracy in the UK. The Treasury, as Deacon (2002b) notes, 
believes that the opportunities available to citizens “are determined by who their 
parents were rather than their own talents and efforts” (HM Treasury, 1999: 31). 
 
Noting a ‘draconian reform’ of work based social security payments across the OECD 
Goodin (2000) is keen to challenge the legitimacy of the imposition of conditionality 
by questioning the principles used to support recent reforms. Dismissing arguments 
that people implicitly consent to a rewriting of the welfare contract that exists between 
the individual citizen and the state, Goodin notes that this argument falls down on two 
levels. At the client/caseworker level he argues that such contracts are one sided. In 
effect the coercion/compulsion of the user is couched as consent. Consent implies a 
notion of choice and given that people have real needs for their benefits the element of 
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choice is missing from the process. At the ‘macro level’ it is often stated that there is a 
wider communal agreement to the idea of a new highly conditional welfare 
settlement. However, it is politicians, not users, who are, “by their own admission, 
tearing up the old social contract…demanding more of the poor…[and] unilaterally 
altering the terms of the contract” (Goodin, 2000 :5). The reciprocity principle is also 
dismissed as seriously flawed. As Goodin notes the obligations that we have to each 
other should be more properly regarded as mutual rather than reciprocal.  
We each have obligations to the other, but those obligations are independent of 
one another. Consequently, my obligations toward you remain in force, even 
after you have defaulted on yours to me (Goodin, 2000 :8) 
Why, he asks, if we accept a duty of care for criminals who have committed terrible 
crimes, should we be allowed to renege on our duty to support certain fellow citizens 
who are not in the PLM, or who behave in what is deemed to be an irresponsible 
manner? White’s (2000) assertion, that in certain circumstances, conditionality can be 
justified on paternalistic grounds is similarly dismissed. Goodin believes that 
unemployment is largely due to wider structural factors rather than individual failings 
that limit people’s ability to engage with the PLM. ‘Weak’ paternalism misses the 
point. It implies a sort of addiction to idleness that is generally not there. ‘Strong’ 
paternalism - based on the idea that work is good for you so we’re going to make you 
do it! – is undermined by the fact that we don’t compel the idle rich to work with the 
same vigour that is reserved for poor people. 
 
In the UK the New Labour government is distancing itself from the notion of welfare 
rights and increasingly embracing, in both principle and practice, the idea that public 
welfare provisions are conditional entitlements. This further diminishes the limited 
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equality that the citizenship of the British PWWS promised. This diminution of 
welfare rights will have the greatest negative effect on those most in need. 
 
Conclusions 
 
A principle of conditionality already underpins New Labour’s employment policy. It 
is also an increasingly important tool in the management of social housing tenants. 
Emerging policies and debate centred on applying sanctions to the housing and child 
benefits of irresponsible parents serves to illustrate several important points. First, the 
ideological distance that New Labour has travelled in a relatively short time. Less 
than a decade ago the Labour Party was opposed to workfare type unemployment 
schemes. In 2002 a New Labour Prime Minister was seriously considering the 
removal of child benefit in certain (extreme) circumstances. If Blair's rhetoric ever 
becomes reality and the removal/reduction of child benefit rights from parents of 
persistent truants becomes policy it needs to be considered that whilst, theoretically, 
the regulations will be universal in application, their punitive effect will be selectively 
felt. Because child benefit remains, for good reasons, a benefit routinely paid to 
mothers it will largely be women (and children) rather than men who are denied 
welfare. Similarly, because removing £15.50 per week from an unemployed lone 
mother whose child persistently truants is qualitatively different from applying the 
same sanction to a middle class dual earning couple, it will be poor women and 
children who will suffer the most.  
 
Second, conditionality lays bare some of an inherent contradiction at the heart of the 
New Labour’s welfare project. It is a stated aim of the present administration to 
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challenge welfare dependency, but as Grover and Stewart (2000) note, only certain 
types of dependency are deemed to be problematic. 
Obviously, for Labour’s true believers having a job which only exists because of 
some scheme of subsidy, and using subsidised nursery places for one’s children, 
is not part of benefit dependency, whereas looking after one’s own children at 
home on benefit is dependency (:248). 
Third, emergent policies and debates indicate a strengthening link between the social 
welfare and criminal justice systems. Regulation and social control has long been a 
central aspect of state welfare (Bauman, 1998). New Labour evidently sees it as 
entirely appropriate to use welfare sanctions as an adjunct of the legal system in order 
to enforce responsible behaviour.  
 
Recognising our wider responsibilities and respecting the rights of others to live in 
peace are central to any notion of citizenship. Governments, however, are wrong to 
place a principle of conditionality at the heart of their welfare state reforms. As 
Douglas Hurd (British Conservative Home Secretary 1985-1989), rather ironically 
given the position he was defending pointed out, “compulsion by the state implies not 
the fulfilment, but the absence or failure of personal responsibility” (Hurd, 1988: 16). 
 
The wider shift towards ‘active/Third Way’ welfare states is an attempt by Western 
governments to renegotiate the welfare deal between citizen and the state. Rights are 
conditional on the acceptance of attendant individual responsibilities. This represents 
a significant qualitative shift away from the public welfare envisaged in the PWWS, 
built around notions of need and entitlement. On one level the changes outlined in the 
paper may be seen as incremental (hence the title of ‘creeping conditionality’); but 
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such changes are significant. They illustrate a more substantial shift in the principles 
that underpin state welfare provision (Cox, 1998; Taylor-Gooby, 2002).  
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